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Abstract 
 
  1
Fiscal federalism: Normative criteria for evaluations, 
developments in selected OECD countries, and empirical 
evidence for Russia 
Abstract1 
Criteria for evaluation of systems of fiscal federalism are derived from the current state of the 
theory of fiscal federalism. In a second step we provide an overview of developments of fiscal 
federalism systems in OECD countries highlighting some existing trends. Third, an overview 
of Russia’s regional economic characteristics underlines several reasons that call for a 
redistribution of income among regions. Fourth, we apply the defined evaluation criteria to 
Russia’s system of fiscal federalism. We find that there has been effective equalization of 
income to regions with relatively low per capita income but it was mainly the medium income 
group of regions that carried the burden for this redistribution. Several relatively very wealthy 
regions were –according to our data- persistently subsidized through the system. Fiscal 
equalization may have caused significant disincentive effects for subnational governments 
because efforts to improve their tax base and raise tax revenues tended to result in a higher net 
share of tax revenues to be transferred to the central government. The transfer system had 
major weaknesses, especially that of promoting bargaining between regions and the center, 
which may not have been solved through recent reforms of the system. Also a very important 
element of fiscal federalism is almost absent, namely revenue discretion on the part of 
subnational governments. Hence, the paper makes reform proposals.  
 
 
JEL classification: H77, P21, R10 
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Equalization, Transition. 
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Blandinieres, Vitaly Tambovtsev, Alexander Andryakov, Lilia Valitova, and by Patricia Alvarez-Plata at DIW. All 
data used in the empirical part of the paper were generously provided by Alexander Andryakov and Lilia Valitova 
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1 Introduction 
Russia’s system of fiscal federalism during transition has been analyzed in many 
contributions (e.g. Treisman, 1996, Zhuravskaya, 2000, Martinez-Vazquez, 2001, Alexeev 
and Kurlyandskaya, 2003, Desai et al., 2003). Above all they found that the system was 
relatively unstable and provided adverse incentives mainly due to the high influence of 
political factors. From the perspective of economic theory the transfer system, the distribution 
of expenditure responsibilities, and the revenue assignments, all had major weaknesses. The 
reforms of fiscal federalism proposed in 2003 by the “Federal commission on the division of 
competences between levels of power in the Russian Federation,“ (in short the ’Kozak 
Commission’) aimed at a comprehensive reform of all elements of the fiscal federalism 
system (e.g. Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2003, Kurlyandskaya, 2004a). 
These proposals were largely consistent with economic theory and they resulted in ongoing 
comprehensive revisions of more than hundred laws (above all the tax code, the budgetary 
code, and the law on general principles of local self government), in the cancellation of laws 
incompatible with the new system and in the introduction of new laws, such as the law on 
monetization of social benefits.  
However, in the beginning of 2005 the reforms were seriously interrupted by an initial 
infeasibility of regions to implement the ’law on monetization of social benefits’. This law 
called for a necessary and very reasonable substitution of cash payments for in-kind social 
benefits to eligible housholds. But the resulting social benefit expenditures were much higher 
than estimated and much higher than the costs of previously granted in-kind benefits.2 This 
resulted not only in some social unrest and in a cancellation of the efforts to implement this 
replacement in many regions but in a halt of the reforms or even chaos, where the issues of 
federalization and redistributing government powers have been left open once again 
(Kurlandskaya, 2005a).  
This difficult current situation could thus be seen as an important chance for improving 
serious weaknesses of the reforms. To show this is the aim of this paper. As one cornerstone 
we present a descriptive analysis of results of the transfer system in the past (1996-2003). It 
                                                 
2 A main reason for this difference is, among others, that in-kind benefits could be granted to households only at 
those localities, where there was a supply of such goods and services (heating, public water, telephone service, 
public transport etc.). By contrast, cash benefits can be granted at any locality.   Discussion Papers   518 
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demonstrates anomalities, which have not been shown in this form before and are surprising, 
despite several important analyses of the transfer system that also found serious weaknesses 
(e.g. Zhuravskaya, 2000, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, 2003, Desai et al., 2003). Policymakers 
should be aware of them in order to ensure that these anomalities do not persist. And this 
would require additional amendments to the new reforms recently implemented, because the 
new system of transfers has still considerable weaknesses. In addition, although the recent 
reforms brought considerable improvements to the expenditure assignments and proper 
financing for functions delegated to subnational governments, they have weaknesses 
concerning insufficient own-source revenues of local governments and insufficient abilities of 
subnational governments to adjust their revenues at the margin.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 presents on the basis 
of the current state of theoretical reasoning those principles for a system of fiscal federalism, 
on which there appears to be general agreement in the literature. Section 3 summarizes 
experiences and new developments in OECD countries concerning reforms of fiscal 
federalism. Section 4 presents our evaluation of Russia’s system on the basis of the criteria 
presented in section 2. We start with the descriptive empirical analysis of the transfer system 
during 1996-1999 showing anomalities. Then it is argued why the recent reforms may not 
achieve a break with this past. Then we evaluate the new distribution of expenditures and the 
revenue assignments. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Evaluation criteria for a fiscal federalism system derived 
from the current state of the theory of fiscal federalism. 
The theory and models of fiscal federalism are concerned, above all, with three broad areas of 
research: 
•  Equalization of income disparities between the regions. 
•  The distribution of government responsibilities (functions) and thus expenditures among 
the different levels of government. 
•  Assignment of revenue sources to the budgets of the different government levels and 
establishment of some taxation autonomy for local governments so as to provide them with 
a certain degree of self-financing and thus self-reliance. 
 Discussion Papers   518 
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An additional important aspect, which has to be considered in each of these research areas, is 
whether the system of fiscal federalism provides incentives for regional and local 
governments to promote within their possibilities sustainable economic growth, to raise 
revenues and minimize costs of service delivery and administration.  
For these areas we explicitly derive criteria from the theoretical literature, which could be 
reasonable minimum standards, or norms, that should be fulfilled by any system of fiscal 
federalism.  
2.1  Equalization of income disparities among regions 
The arguments for vertical and horizontal fiscal equalization are manifold.3 Most well known 
is the argument for redistribution of income between wealthier and poorer regions. 
Redistribution serves to maintain a certain level of public goods provision and thus certain 
minimum social standards throughout the country. Additional arguments include the 
establishment of an efficient nationwide net of physical infrastructure, insurance for public 
budgets against sudden revenue shocks, and the internalization of vertical and horizontal 
spillover effects of budget decisions taken by the central or a subnational government. Hence, 
fiscal equalization may create important potential beneficial effects expected to raise the long 
run growth potential of the entire country. However, redistribution is likely to have adverse 
incentive effects on the behavior of the regions and their magnitude may rise with the degree 
of equalization, i.e. the chosen equalization coefficient. Although the research concerning 
such adverse effects is only evolving and very limited, the available evidence suggests that 
they need to be taken seriously (see the examples for disincentives shown for Canada in 
Smart and Bird, 1997, and Smart, 1998, and for Germany in Baretti, Fenge et al., 2000, and 
Baretti, Huber et al., 2000). Assuming that a rising degree of equalization produces both 
benefits and disincentives, there is thus an optimal level for it, where the marginal benefits 
and marginal costs of equalization are equal.  
There is agreement in the literature about essential characteristics of a well-designed system 
of vertical and horizontal transfers (e.g. Bird and Wallich, 1993, Ladd, 1994): It should be 
transparent in the sense that rules or formulas determine the transfers rather than discretion 
and political bargaining. Transfers should be based on the potential revenue-raising capacity 
                                                 
3 See the discussion, for instance, in Boadway and Hobson (1993). Discussion Papers   518 
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and not on actual revenues so as to avoid disincentives to fiscal effort. Transfers should in 
principle be of an unconditional nature and not interfere with the expenditure priorities of 
local governments with two important exceptions: The first one concerns transfers to finance 
social protection.4 The second exception concerns the financing of expenditures with 
“spillovers”, i.e. sizable benefits for outsiders (non-residents of the respective jurisdiction), 
such as education, interstate infrastructure, and arguably also health care. These transfers may 
take on a conditional nature to protect the interests of outsiders. Such conditional transfers are 
often matching (conditional) grants, where the central government pays a part of the cost of 
certain expenditures carried out by local governments.5  
Considering these arguments, a pragmatic approach is adopted and two very flexible norms 
are defined:  
-  There should be a positive effective degree of equalization without causing significant 
adverse incentive effects for regional governments to promote regional economic growth, 
provide for efficient administration and raise revenues. To empirically assess the 
fulfillment of this norm thus requires measurement of both the effective degree of 
equalization and of potential disincentive effects. 
-  The transfer system should be based on rules, be transparent, and it should consider the 
potential revenue-raising capacity. Only those transfers that are intended to cover 
expenditure programs with sizable spillovers (e.g. education, health, interregional 
infrastructure) and transfers that finance social protection should be of a conditional nature.  
 
                                                 
4 The central government should guarantee a minimum level of social support for families and individuals 
irrespective of the fiscal situation of the respective local or regional government. At the same time, the 
competence of local authorities especially concerning the prevention of misuse of social support should be utilized 
and administrative costs minimized so that local authorities should deliver these services and possibly determine 
some details of the provision. Conditional transfers may accomplish these goals better than either forcing 
subnational governments to finance all social support or to burden the central government not only with the 
financing task but also with the task of efficient provision of social support. 
5 Although there are no guidelines as to the precise matching rate appropriate for particular expenditure 
programs, the rate could be viewed as having three components (Bird and Wallich (1993)): There is a basic 
matching rate, which reflects the degree of interest on the part of the central government in the provision of the 
service, motivated by spillovers or other considerations. The second component is a uniformly determined 
measure of fiscal capacity. The third element is the degree of local demand elasticity (local enthusiasm). Thus, 
the matching rate faced by a given local government would be higher, the larger the central interest and the lower 
both the local fiscal capacity and demand elasticity are.  Discussion Papers   518 
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2.2  Distribution of expenditure responsibilities among the different 
levels of government 
The view of Musgrave (1959) is still widely shared, that of the three main functions of a 
government (i.e. allocation, redistribution and stabilization) only the allocation function may 
be shared by the different government levels. Redistribution activities should be exclusively 
performed by the central government, because otherwise competition of regional 
governments, enforced by mobility and migration of private households, may lead to an 
erosion of the social support system.6 The important point is that these policies should be 
formulated on the national level and financed in whole or to a large extent by central transfers 
so that local competition in social policies is largely prevented. The same is analogously true 
with regard to macroeconomic stabilization. This function cannot be effectively performed by 
regional and local governments, because neither do they have particular incentives to 
implement coordinated counter-cyclical measures such as tax reductions and spending 
increases during a recession (or the opposite during a boom), nor are they responsible for 
monetary policy, which is also an important instrument for stabilization. But regional and 
local levels are, of course, asked to support central government stabilization efforts and not to 
undermine them, which would call for the establishment of a formal “stability pact” that 
regulates the responsibilities in the area of stabilization.  
Overall then the distribution of government responsibilities among the different government 
levels concerns primarily the allocation function. This function refers to the provision of 
public goods and services including the correction of inefficiencies of private markets. 
However, among these tasks are also many important ones where it is not controversial that 
they should be the responsibility of the central government and not of lower levels of 
government, either because the central government can implement them at lower 
administrative costs or because competition of regional governments may lead to 
inefficiencies such as an undersupply of public services. Following Bird and Wallich (1993) it 
may be argued that the allocation function of the State includes three types of services, whose 
provision in the sense of defining supply levels and securing adequate financing should be the 
                                                 
6 This does, however, not mean that local governments should not be involved in formulating social support 
policies and deliver social services on the local level. Their expertise is very much needed in defining these 
policies and in making the provision of social services  efficient, which includes minimization of local 
administrative costs in providing the services and of misuse and also permanent monitoring of their effectiveness. Discussion Papers   518 
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responsibility of the central government or in some instances, that of regional governments, 
but not the responsibility of local ones: 
First, those services for which there are, or are for political reasons presumed to be, no 
significant differences in demands in different jurisdictions (e.g. defense, national security, 
education, public health). Second, services which exhibit sizable beneficial “spillovers” 
between jurisdictions (e.g. education, public health, environmental protection, interstate 
transport). Third, services for which the additional costs of local administration are 
sufficiently high to outweigh advantages for them to be administered by local governments 
(e.g. administration of income taxes).7  
Despite the central government´s overall responsibility for the provision of services that 
satisfy these criteria, the actual delivery of many of them may well be delegated to local 
governments in order to adhere to the subsidiarity principle and realize efficiency gains. 
Transfers and a control system concerning the execution could guarantee that minimum 
provisioning standards are fulfilled nationwide.  
Considering all these arguments, our evaluative norm becomes: Local governments should 
have the expenditure responsibility for all those public goods and services in the allocation 
branch, which may be assumed to have significant differences in demand in different 
localities and are not associated with considerable spillovers. In addition, they may become 
the executor of expenditure programs defined by the central government and financed via 
transfers concerning public goods and services that are characterized by significant 
spillovers. Thus, subnational governments may receive expenditure assignments for a large 
array of goods and services, examples of which are presented in table 1.8  
 
                                                 
7 The tasks of education and health care show that the Bird and Wallich (1993) criteria are not mutually exclusive. 
Further examples for tasks of the central government within its allocation function that also satisfy several of these 
criteria are competition policies and other regulatory policies to prevent market failures (supervision of financial 
and energy markets, of telecommunication, railways etc.). 
8 The categorization shown in table 1 is subjective and indicative only because arguments can be made that most 
expenditure functions are shared between levels of government. The goal here is to provide nevertheless an 
orientation for the expenditure distribution between the different government levels. Discussion Papers   518 
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Table 2-1 
Indicative expenditure assignments for subnational governments in the “allocation branch” of the 
functions of government 
  Responsibilities for local governments  Responsibilities for regional 
governments shared with the central 
government 
Theoretical 
distinction 
of services  
Services that are assumed 
to exhibit significant 
differences in local 
demands and which may 
not cause substantial 
spillovers between juris-
dictions 
Services that are assumed 
to exhibit differences in 
local demands and which 
may cause significant 
spillovers, that could, 
however, be handled by 
transfers or contracting 
Services for which there are, or are for 
political reasons presumed to be, no 
significant differences in local demands.  
Services which have significant spillovers 
that cannot be satisfactorily handled by 
transfers or contracting.  
Servcies for which the additional costs of 
local administration are sufficiently higher 
to outweigh the advantages of being 
administered by local governments. 
Concrete 
examples 
of servcies 
Local public 
transportation 
Fire protection 
Local Roads 
Libraries 
Local police services 
Sanitation 
Sewage 
Public utilities 
Housing 
Culture and parks 
Sports facilities 
Community centers 
Basic education 
(including child care) 
Basic health services 
Interlocal transportation 
Secondary and higher education 
Secondary and tertiary hospitals 
Special service hospitals 
Interstate roads 
Local museums 
2.3  Assignment of revenue sources to the budgets of the different 
government levels and establishment of some taxation 
autonomy for local governments  
There appears to be general agreement in the literature about key principles concerning the 
assignment of taxes to the different government levels: 
-  Taxes on relatively mobile factors of production (e.g. taxes on labor and profits, capital 
gains tax), taxes that are usually progressive for the purpose of income redistribution (e.g. 
personal income tax, inheritance tax), and taxes whose base can be verified better by the 
national government than by local governments (e.g. income taxes) should be primarily 
determined by the central government.9 Otherwise the following main problems may arise: 
First, tax competition among the lower levels of government may lead to undertaxation of 
relatively mobile factors of production (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Edwards and 
                                                 
9 However, there is also broad agreement in the literature that local governments could and should be allowed to 
levy surcharges -within certain limits- on those of these taxes, which are borne by local residents, such as the 
personal income tax and the inheritance tax.  Discussion Papers   518 
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Keen, 1996, Sinn, 1998, Hines, 1999). Second, redistribution tasks are unlikely to be 
satisfactorily fulfilled (Wildasin, 1991), Feldstein and Vaillant, 1994). Third, tax evasion 
may be promoted, if local governments are less able than the central government to verify 
the tax bases. In addition, natural resources, although immobile, should be taxed by the 
central government because they are usually regionally concentrated thus contributing to 
uneven regional development if regional governments keep the revenues. 
-  Regional and local governments should have significant own revenue sources determined 
within limits by themselves. Only then can there be some beneficial tax competition 
between jurisdictions, can their autonomy and accountability be enhanced, and thus an 
improved allocation of resources be expected. The taxes they are entitled to levy should 
concern relatively immobile factors (e.g. land, fixed property) and they could be 
surcharges on income and property taxes borne by local residents. The taxes and fees 
levied by them should to the extent possible be benefit related in order not to repel mobile 
factors, i.e. “…neutralize the impact of fiscal operations on location choice” (Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1984, p. 517). 
-  Given that the own revenues of lower levels of government, including subnational 
surcharges, will usually cover only a fraction of the expenditure responsibilities, the 
remainder must be financed via tax sharing, revenue sharing, and transfers.  
Of these, from an economic point of view, tax sharing is the least preferred financing method. 
Tax sharing means that the central government determines the base and the rates of the tax, 
and shares revenues with the subnational jurisdictions where revenues originate. Hence, there 
is no tax competition, and fiscal autonomy and accountability exist only in spending (Mc 
Lure, 1995).  
Revenue sharing provides financing to subnational governments on the basis of factors such 
as population, average income, incidence of poverty, tax capacity and fiscal effort. It too 
provides little subnational fiscal autonomy but it is considered to be an effective means of 
fiscal equalization (Mc Lure, 1995). 
Considering all these arguments, our norm regarding the assignment of revenue sources and 
taxes has the following four main elements:  
-  Lower levels of government should have significant own revenues determined within limits 
by themselves.  Discussion Papers   518 
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-  Taxes levied by them should not concern the relatively mobile factors of production with 
one exception, namely surcharges on the central government personal income tax and 
inheritance tax, which they should be allowed to levy within limits.  
-  The revenue sources granted to subnational governments should, of course, be sufficient to 
cover their expenditure responsibilities and, if these responsibilities have a tendency to 
rise,10 the revenue sources should increase accordingly and without a significant time lag. 
- The revenue sources for subnational governments should be relatively stable and 
predictable.  
Table 2–2 summarizes our evaluative framework. 
Table 2-2 
Summary of framework for evaluating intergovernmental fiscal relations  
Equalization of income 
disparities among regions 
Distribution of expenditure 
responsibilities 
Assignment of revenue sources
- There should be a positive 
effective degree of equalization 
of income between regions. 
- Equalization should not cause 
significant adverse incentive 
effects for subnational 
governments, for instance with 
regard to improving their own 
tax base, the efficiency of their 
tax and other government 
administration, and the 
efficiency of their expenditure 
decisions.  
- The transfer system should be 
based on transparent rules, 
which consider the potential 
rather than the actual revenue-
raising capacity. Only those 
transfers that are intended to 
cover expenditure programs 
with sizable spillovers should be 
of a conditional nature (e.g. 
education, health, interregional 
infrastructure). 
- The assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities should be 
clearcut and follow the 
subsidiarity principle. 
- Thus, local governments should 
have the expenditure 
responsibility for all those 
public goods and services in the 
allocation branch, which may be 
assumed to have significant 
differences in demand in 
different localities and which are 
not associated with considerable 
spillovers, unless these 
spillovers are considered in the 
(well designed) transfer system. 
Hence, subnational governments 
may receive expenditure 
assignments for a large array of 
goods and services, examples of 
which are suggested in table 1. 
- The efficiency of the fulfillment 
of responsibilities should be 
regularly and automatically 
assessed, based, for instance, on 
national and international 
comparisons. 
- Lower levels of government 
should have significant own 
revenues determined within 
limits by themselves so as to 
provide them the opportunity to 
adjust their revenues at the 
margin.  
- Taxes levied by them should not 
concern the relatively mobile 
factors of production with one 
exception, namely surcharges on 
the personal income tax, which 
they should be allowed to levy 
within limits. 
- Natural resources (although 
immobile) should be taxed by 
the central government. 
- The revenue sources granted to 
subnational governments should 
be sufficient to cover their 
expenditure responsibilities.  
- The revenue sources should 
increase together with the 
responsibilities without a 
significant time lag.  
- The revenue sources should be 
relatively stable and predictable. 
 
                                                 
10 There is considerable empirical evidence that supports “Wagner´s law” according to which the scale of total 
government activity tends to expand relative to the national economy, especially in developing countries, e.g. 
Beck (1979).  Discussion Papers   518 
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3  Experiences and new developments in selected OECD 
countries 
In many OECD countries fiscal relations between the central and lower levels of government 
have come under increasing scrutiny in an attempt to improve public sector efficiency and 
thus to promote economic growth. In several European countries an additional reason for the 
increased discussion of fiscal federalism was fiscal consolidation required in response to both 
unfavorable demographic trends and the formal limiting of public sector deficits and public 
debt growth prior to the European Monetary Union. This indirectly forced countries to 
consider and possibly to regulate the split of public debt growth among the different levels of 
government. The effects of “globalization” may also have contributed to this increased 
thinking about reforms of fiscal federalism in many countries. But although serious 
discussions in many countries are taking place, they have not yet been followed by actual 
comprehensive reforms of fiscal federalism systems. Rather many countries with formerly 
relatively low degrees of decentralization (measured, for instance, by the share of 
expenditures of sub-national governments in total public expenditures) increased this degree 
successively and devolved somewhat the provision of public goods in steps (e.g. Argentina, 
France to a minor extent, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), whereas several 
countries with formerly relatively high degrees of decentralization lowered this degree 
somewhat (e.g. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland). Thus, 
at least with regard to high-income OECD countries there appears to be a trend of 
convergence towards a medium degree of fiscal decentralization (e.g. Thießen 2003).  
But devolution of expenditure functions has not proceeded evenly and a generally accepted 
new “model” of how to organize fiscal relations between different levels of government, 
which could be presented here, has not yet developed. Owing to the institutional differences 
of countries, a universal model may also be difficult to develop. But there appears to be 
widespread agreement on the general “norms” outlined in the previous section and thus on 
setting the proper incentive structure.  
3.1  Transfer and equalization schemes  
The experiences in several OECD countries concerning transfer and equalization schemes 
show that disincentive effects for both recipient and donor regions were increasingly 
recognized. Consequently there have been reforms of these systems simply by freezing or Discussion Papers   518 
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reducing the equalization component of transfers and grants (e.g. Italy and Spain), or by using 
partial equalization (e.g. Nordic countries). Thus, deliberate compromises concerning equity 
objectives were made (Joumard and Konigsgrud, 2003). Incentive problems were also 
identified owing to a widespread problem of poor cost-effectiveness in service delivery. To 
counteract these problems many OECD countries refined their transfer systems through 
replacing earmarked grants by general-purpose grants, introducing performance criteria, and 
with regard to matching grants matching rates were reduced.  
3.2 Distribution  of  responsibilities among the different levels of 
government 
Expenditures on education, health care, and social security account for the largest share of 
sub-national spending in most countries, especially with regard to the regional level of 
government in federal countries (Joumard and Konigsrud 2003, OECD 2003). In the 
mentioned countries whose degree of fiscal decentralization tended to rise, a common reason 
was a reassignment of certain functions to sub-national governments. In particular, this refers 
to health care and education in Italy, Mexico, Spain, and regarding welfare programs in 
Korea. In several central European countries there has also been a recent devolution of 
expenditure assignments, for instance, in the Czech Republic hospital ownership was shifted 
to regional governments, in Poland responsibilities regarding education, roads, and health care 
were shifted to subnational governments, and in Hungary regarding education. In Canada, 
responsibilties for some labor maket policies were shifted to subnational governments. 
Friedrich et al. (2003) studied the case of four European countries (Germany, Poland, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom) and argued that for these countries local expenditures for 
social tasks increased, central government interventions with fiscal consequences for sub-
national governments have intensified, and municipalities experienced a reduction in revenue 
autonomy.  
An increase of responsibilities and/or autonomy on the part of lower levels of government in 
the provision of public goods and services such as education, health care, social benefits, and 
labor market policies may result in deteriorating sub-national government fiscal balances or in 
the underprovision of these important goods and services due to too little consideration being 
given to their very important positive externalities and to economies of scale. As a way to 
alleviate this problem, a trend is observable in many countries, and also in Russia, that smaller 
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economically efficient and that this method has only limited power as a remedy: If sub-
national governments are responsible for the provision of a growing array of public goods and 
services, full utilization of positive externalitites requires well-designed revenue sources for 
their financing including a transfer system that provides sufficient resources but no 
disincentive effects for developing the local tax base etc. Experiences, however, have been, 
that this task has not yet been satisfactorily solved. The discussions on revenues for 
subnational governments intensified. 
3.3  Assignment of revenue sources  
Given the apparent convergence of the degree of fiscal decentralization towards a medium 
degree, which is observable at least among the group of high-income OECD countries, there 
is no unique pattern of the development across countries of the sub-national share of general 
government revenues excluding inter-governmental transfers (Joumard and Konigsrud 2003, 
OECD 2003). But in those countries that experienced an increase in fiscal decentralization, 
the subnational revenue share tended to increase, in some cases markedly (e.g. Italy and 
Spain), and in those countries that lowered their formerly relatively high decentralization 
degree, this trend was generally falling somewhat (e.g. Scandinavian countries), reflecting 
endeavors to adjust revenue assignments to expenditure responsibilites.  
However, the issue of own-revenue sources and of revenue autonomy of sub-national 
governments, especially of local governments, has been widely acknowledged to be a crucial 
question that needs attention. It is one of the most difficult issues of fiscal federalism, because 
there are only very few taxes and fees, which fulfill the theoretical demands summarized in 
the previous section to be good revenue sources for local governments (i.e. immobile tax 
bases, evenly geographically distributed, and generating stable revenues over the business 
cycle).  
A general characteristic of this discussion in many countries is that there is increasing 
agreement to give sub-national governments more power to determine their tax revenues and 
fees. The use of “piggybacking” on taxes levied by the central government, i.e. allowing sub-
national governments to impose a surcharge on federal taxes, such as the personal income tax 
and enterprise profit tax, is often used and generally considered to be a feasible method. But 
owing to long run experiences with this method, it is acknowledged that there should be lower Discussion Papers   518 
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und upper limits for such surcharges.11 Due to manifold experiences, there appears also to be 
agreement to not allow subnational governments to give tax credits, deferrals, and exemptions 
from taxes, because this may lead to erosions of otherwise important tax bases.   
An issue of increasing importance especially in high-income countries is that sub-national 
governments compete in offering potential investors in-kind benefits such as infrastructure 
improvements etc. This is often used as a substitute for tax credits when they are restricted, or 
as an additional incentive for investors. It does not affect the revenue side but expenditures. 
Of course, fiscal federalism aims at securing a high degree of competititon among sub-
national governments but competition of this type may have to be limited in order to offer a 
level playing field: not only those regions with relatively strong financial resources should be 
able to attract investments.  
In OECD countries the mix of sub-national tax revenue varies substantially (Table 3). In 
many countries property taxes have high importance (e.g. anglo-saxon and French speaking 
countries, Spain, Italy and several central Eastern European ones), and almost everywhere 
consumption taxes are a less important revenue source, except in the US.12 But there is no 
clear trend development regarding the relative weight of income taxes versus property taxes. 
Considering the disadvantages of both types of taxes one may argue that an approximate 
equal weight of both, which is about the average for federal and unitary OECD countries, 
could be a reasonable approach. The table also shows the relatively low local own-source 
revenues from taxes in Russia. 
 
                                                 
11 Autonomy of sub-national governments in this regard caused, for instance, high rates of the personal income 
tax in Denmark and Sweden, leading to distorted labor supply decisions. Regarding the enterprise profit tax a 
problem is, of course, its relatively high revenue volatility. Surcharges on sales taxes caused inefficient inter-state 
trade in the US. 
12 The US have a sales tax, whose tax rates are determined by regions but no VAT. All other countries have a 
VAT. Discussion Papers   518 
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Table 3-1 
Revenue Autonomy of Local Governments in Selected Countries 
Composition of own-source revenues    Own-source 
revenues in % 
of total local 
revenues 1/ 
Non-Tax 1/  Income and 
profit taxes 
Property taxes  Consump-tion 
taxes 
Federal  Countries  53 28 12 10  3 
Austria  50  42 0 3 3 
Belgium  47 8  16  17 5 
Germany  55  39  11 5 0 
Mexico  22  22 0 0 0 
Switzerland  82  33  42 7 0 
United  States  62 21  2 30  9 
Russia 2001 
Estimate for after reforms, i.e.  
starting 2004 
ca. 15 
 
ca. 5 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
ca. 1.5 
 
ca.  1.5 
ca. 10.9  2/ 
 
ca. 3 
ca. 1.5 
 
ca. 0.3 
Unitary  Countries  48 20 12 12  1 
Czech  Republic  25  20 0 5 0 
Denmark  57  10  45 2 0 
Finland  67  32  33 2 0 
France  71 17  n.a. 21  n.a. 
Hungary  29  23 0 1 5 
Ireland  37 21  0 16  0 
Italy  39 14  0 15  0 
Netherlands  28  20 0 5 3 
New  Zealand  89 36  0 52  1 
Norway  18  17 0 1 0 
Poland  50 33  0 14  3 
Spain  57 15 10 21  6 
Sweden  82  12  70 0 0 
United  Kingdom  28 16  0 11  0 
1/ Excludes transfers. 
2/ Comprises land tax (1.8 %) and housing stock and social infrastructure maintenance tax (9.1%).  
Sources: Wetzel (2004), p. 18., Center for Fiscal Policy (2001), p.6, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2003), 
and own estimates. Data are for 1995 if not otherwise indicated. 
 
Friedrich et al. (2003) argue that that fiscal autonomy of local governments can be protected 
through conditional grants, which are widely used in western Europan countries. But grants 
are not own-source revenues that can be adjusted at the margin by sub-national governments. 
In addition, the central government controls at least the grant conditions. 
In sum, a good model of financing sub-national governments, especially local governments, 
that proved its practical value is an open issue. 
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4  Empirical evidence of Russia’s system of fiscal federalism 
4.1  Brief overview of regional inequalities 
To give an impression of regional inequalities and characteristics, in Figure 1, panel 1 and 2, 
all 89 regions except Chechnya13 are ranked according to per capita income. The regions 
shown in panel 1 are the lower per capita income half of all regions (in the following: ’lower 
income half’ or ’poorer regions’) and the regions shown in panel 2 are the upper per capita 
income half (in the following: ’upper income half’ or ’wealthier regions’). As can be seen, the 
distribution of per capita income in Russia is extremely unequal: In 2002 the six regions with 
highest per capita income had a share in Russia’s GDP of nearly 40%, they raised 34% of all 
tax revenues and 67% of tax revenues from extraction of natural ressources. Also shown is the 
unenployment rate. The highest unemployment rates can be found among the poorest regions, 
although there are several relatively wealthy regions that also have unemployment rates above 
the national average. The average unemployment rate in 2002 was for the lower income half 
11% and for the upper income half 8.3%. 
Since natural ressource wealth is an important element in Russia’s system of fiscal federalism, 
the ratio of tax revenues from natural ressources extraction to GDP is also shown. It can be 
interpreted as one measure of fiscal autonomy but also of fiscal dependency on natural 
ressources extraction. This ratio is on average clearly higher among the relatively wealthy 
regions, although there are many regions in the upper income half that do not have significant 
revenues from this source. 
Finally, the average ratios during 1996-2002 of total tax revenues collected to GDP are 
shown. This ratio was somewhat higher on average for the upper income half of all regions 
than for the lower income half (during the period 1996-2002 it was on average 19% for the 
regions shown in panel 1 and 22% for the regions shown in panel 2). Surprisingly, however, 
there are four relatively poor regions with very high tax revenue to GDP ratios above 30% 
(Ingushskaja republic, Aginsky Burjatskij AO, Mordovia republic, and Altai republic). When 
eliminating these four regions from the group of regions in the lower income half, then this 
group had on average a substantially lower tax revenue to GDP ratio than the regions in the 
upper income half. 
                                                 
13 Chechnya is excluded from all calculations due to data availability and problems caused by the war. Discussion Papers   518 
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In sum, the distribution of regional GDP is extremely unequal and the averages for the two 
defined groups of regions show marked differences, such as a higher unemployment rate, a 
lower tax revenue to GDP ratio, and a lower ratio of tax revenues from natural ressource 
extraction to GDP in the poorer regions, all of which may call for a redistribution of income. 
However, there are several exceptions to these observations.  
4.2  Equalization of income disparities among regions 
The following descriptive analysis can be based only on the past using the data 1996-2003 
and it shows some anomalities. Recently reforms of the old system of equalization were 
implemented. But even they have weaknesses, which are discussed, and which may cause a 
continuation of the anomalities unless they will be further amended. Therefore this 
description of the past has importance for current policies.  
a)   Has the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations provided for a positive effective 
degree of equalization of income between regions?  
To simplify the analysis, Russia’s system of fiscal equalization can be regarded as a two step 
redistributive system: In the first step the regions pay a part of collected tax revenues to the 
central government and in the second and final step they receive transfers. All transfers 
received from any governmental fund and any additional payment made by the regions to the 
central government are combined in this second step. Therefore the transfers of the second 
step of fiscal equalization are denoted ’net transfers received’.  
The part of collected tax revenues, which the regions have to transfer to the central 
government, can be considered a tax on regional tax revenues levied by the central 
government. Dividing the tax revenues passed on to the central government by total regional 
tax revenues gives the “tax rate” on tax revenues. Since there is no “tax free amount” and no 
progressive “tax schedule”, this average tax rate is also a “marginal tax rate” paid by the 
regions on additional tax revenues. It is denoted MTR1 in figure 2. In other words, this rate 
says which part of one additional tax unit raised by a region has to be passed on to the central 
government.  
If regions have some power to influence tax revenues, for instance through increasing their 
tax base, this tax rate provides some information about their incentives to raise additional tax 
revenues. Figure 2, panel 1 and 2, show that there is no tendency for MTR1 to be dependent 
upon per capita income: In the period 1996-2002 MTR1 was on average 39% for the lower Discussion Papers   518 
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income group of regions and 38% for the higher income group. Thus the fiscal equalization 
system did not use this tax rate MTR1 as a policy instrument to redistribute income from 
wealthy regions to poor regions. Also the level of this tax rate, namely 20% to 45% for most 
regions may be considered to be in an range that was not so high that it could be expected to 
cause very strong disincentives to raise tax revenues. But the figure reveals a special 
characteristic of the system, namely that this tax rate was highly positively correlated with the 
ratio of tax revenues to GDP. (The correlation coefficient for the period 1996-2002 is .79). In 
other words, the higher the ratio of tax revenues to GDP, the higher tended to be the tax rate 
on these tax revenues. This, of course, means per se that raising additional tax revenues is 
“punished” and it is a disincentive to raise revenues.  
Since the first step of fiscal equalization (setting MTR1) did not incorporate an apparent 
redistributive element, the second and final step must have provided for redistribution, if the 
system intended to redistribute income from relatively wealthy to relatively poor regions. And 
indeed Figure 2, panel 1 and 2, shows that the ratio of net transfers received to GDP was on 
average significantly higher for the regions of the lower income half (panel 1) than it was for 
the upper income half regions (panel 2). The former group received on average during 1996-
2002 net transfers in the amount of 10% of GDP whereas the latter group received 6% of 
GDP. The regions in the medium per capita income range received very low net transfers with 
few exceptions. Hence, fiscal equalization has been redistributive. However, there are several 
regions in the upper income group that received very substantial net transfers relative to their 
GDP (Figure 2, panel 2). This, of course, mitigates the redistributive effect of the fiscal 
equalization system.  
Deducting the net transfers received in the second round of fiscal equalization from the tax 
revenues passed on to the central government in the first round gives a net figure of payments 
to the center. It can be negative if all transfers received are higher than payments made. 
Dividing these net payments by total regional collected tax revenues yields a net tax rate on 
tax revenues, called MTR2. Like MTR1 it is an average and marginal tax rate. Figure 3, panel 
1 and 2, shows that for the poorest regions MTR2 has been mostly highly negative, and for all 
other regions it has been mostly highly positive but there are several exceptions and, 
surprisingly, some regions with relatively very high income had highly negative tax ratios. 
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for the upper income half regions 12%. This confirms the overall effective redistributive 
function of the system but, of course, there are quantitatively important outliers.  
Another way to evaluate the effectiveness of redistribution of the system is to compare the per 
capita income position of individual regions relative to the national average before and after 
fiscal equalization. Figure 4 shows this for the averages of the years 1996-2003. It becomes 
clear that several relatively wealthy regions with per capita tax revenues substantially above 
the national average before fiscal equalization had even higher per capita revenues in percent 
of the national average after fiscal equalization. These regions (Chukotskij AO, Evenkijskij 
AO, Korjakskij AO, Tajmyrskij AO, Magadanskaja oblast, Sakha-Jakutia Republic and 
Kamchatskaja oblast) can be found in area I, i.e. to the left of the ’line of neutrality of the 
fiscal equalization system’ (which is the locus for regions whose income is unaffected by the 
equalization system) and above the ’line of complete fiscal equalization’ (which is the locus 
of regions whose income is equal to national average after equalization). Figures 4.1-4.8 in 
the appendix show these relative positions of all regions before and after equalization for each 
of the considered years.  
The relative income position of several of the relatively very wealthy regions was 
substantially improved. An extreme example is Korjakskij AO, whose relative income 
position was raised in 2003 from 184% of national income before fiscal equalization to 400% 
after equalization (Figure 4.8, appendix). And also in all other considered years this relatively 
wealthy region received strong financial support. The figures also show that other very 
wealthy regions were only relatively mildly burdened by the equalization system.  
Moreover, many regions with per capita tax revenues below the national average before fiscal 
equalization were even put further below the national average after fiscal equalization. These 
latter regions can be found in the area IV of figure 4, which is the area below the ’line of 
complete fiscal equalization’ and to the right of the ’line of neutrality of fiscal equalization’ 
(e.g. Sankt-Peterburg and Lipeckaja oblast). Surprisingly the number of regions increased that 
were located in this particular area IV from 26 in 2000 to 45 in 2003 and this was the largest 
number in all considered years (Figure 4.8, appendix).  
Thus, Russia’s system of fiscal equalization resulted in many regions located in the two 
discussed problematic graphical areas I and IV. Good arguments would be needed to justify 
this, but an analysis of the background of each of these individual cases is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  Discussion Papers   518 
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Thus, from this descriptive evaluation we can infer that for the period considered there has 
been an effective redistribution of income to regions with relatively low per capita income but 
since several of the regions in the top income group received substantial net transfers it was 
mainly the medium income group of regions that carried the burden for this redistribution. In 
addition, there has been a growing number of regions with per capita income below national 
average before fiscal equalization whose relative income position even deteriorated through 
fiscal redistribution.  
b)  Has fiscal equalization caused significant disincentive effects for subnational 
governments?  
A redistribution of income always entails the risk of causing adverse incentives. In the case of  
fiscal equalization among regions, one needs to ask whether the system may have caused 
disincentives for subnational governments to improve regional economic growth, the own tax 
base, and the efficiency of both administration and expenditures. Incentive effects provided 
by the fiscal equalization system may best be analyzed through panel regression analysis. It 
may shed light on the quantitative influence of the equalization system on regional economic 
growth, tax revenues, and administrative costs.14 This regression analysis is beyond the scope 
of this paper but it is proposed to be performed in additional work: The available data basis 
and the possibility to augment it through appropriate control variables enable us to gain 
potentially powerful insights (i.e. quantitative estimates) regarding the economic effects of the 
fiscal equalization system.  
In the absence of this proposed regression analysis we may base our evaluation of incentive 
effects on examining the two measures of marginal tax rates (MTR1 and MTR2) we have 
compiled. In standard economic analysis of incentive effects, marginal tax rates are a very 
important variable determining incentives for proper economic behavior. In Figure 2, panel 1 
and 2, we have seen that MTR1, the burden on regional tax revenues in “the first round of 
fiscal equalization” is for most regions within a corridor of 20% to 45%, which may suggest 
                                                 
14 In such an analysis variables need to be defined that capture the influence of the fiscal equalization system on 
outcomes such as annual per capita regional economic growth. Empirical research of this type is very new and 
scarce. Variables used in these few papers as proxies for the influence of the equalization system have been the 
volume of fiscal equalization and the marginal tax rate MTR2 discussed above (Baretti, Huber, and Lichtblau, 
2002, Thießen, 2004), and, in a study on Canada, year dummies intended to measure the effect of a reform of the 
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that the burden in this phase of fiscal equalization may not have been unjustifiably or 
’prohibitively’ high.15  
But the discussed high positive correlation between tax revenue to GDP ratios and MTR1 
during 1996-2003 may suggest that there have been strong disincentives for regions to 
increase their tax base for instance through measures to become more attractive to companies 
and other tax payers, because higher tax revenues resulted, on average, in higher shares of 
these revenues to be transferred to the central government. At the same time the ratio of net 
transfers received to GDP was not highly positively correlated with the ratio of tax revenues 
to GDP. (The correlation coefficient of the averages during 1996-2003 was merely .11). This 
means that raising the ratio of tax revenues to GDP was not rewarded by a relatively high 
ratio of transfers received to GDP, although there are a few exceptions among the relatively 
poor regions (Ingushskaja republic, Aginskij Burjatskij AO, Altaij republic), and one 
exception among the wealthiest regions (Chukotskij AO).  
However, the net result of regional payments and received transfers relative to tax revenues is 
given by MTR2, which is the average and marginal tax rate on tax revenues after completion 
of fiscal equalization (Figure 3, panel 1 and 2). Those regions with a negative MTR2 were the 
net recipients in the equalization system and those with a positive MTR2 were the net 
contributors. The extent of subsidization or burdening of regions is shown in terms of ratios to 
regional tax revenues. As can be seen, the relatively poor regions in the lowest income fifth of 
all regions were mostly net recipients of ressources. There is a clear upward trend of the 
average tax rate MTR2 during 1996-2003 in figure 3, as per capita income of the regions 
rises, but there are some exceptions (i.e. regions in the upper per capita income half that have 
a negative average MTR2, such as oblasts Kemerovskaja, Amurskaja, and Kamchatskaja) 
and, surprisingly, four of the regions in the top ten per capita income group had a highly 
negative average MTR2 (Magadankskaja oblast, Sakha-Jakutia republic, Korjakskij AO, 
Chukotskij AO). Thus, these relatively wealthy regions were even net recipients in the 
system. 
In sum this descriptive analysis suggests that although there has been an effective 
redistribution of ressources to relatively poor regions, the incentives provided by the fiscal 
                                                 
15 There were, however, 8 regions whose average MTR1 during 1996-2003 reached 50% or more, and four of 
these regions fell in the lowest income fifth of all regions. It could be possible that these regions interpret the 
relatively high MTR1 they face as unfair treatment despite the relatively high ratios of tax revenues to GDP they 
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equalization system for regions to improve their tax base and raise tax revenues may have 
been inhibited, because such efforts would tend to result in a higher share of tax revenues to 
be transferred to the central government and no significant increase in net transfers received 
relative to GDP. Also the fact that several very wealthy regions were persistently subsidized 
through the system on a net basis may have resulted in perceived unfair treatment especially 
by the many middle and higher per capita income regions that faced a relatively high net 
burden of up to 50% of their tax revenues.  
c) The transfer system should be based on transparent rules, which consider the 
potential rather than the actual revenue-raising capacity.  
Russia has already for many years used state of the art formulas for calculating fiscal 
equalization transfers from the central government to regional governments (such as the 
federal fund for support to the regions, abbreviated in Russian “FFPR”): they consider not 
only potential fiscal capacity but also the regionally different costs of supplying public goods 
and services through use of an “expenditure needs index” (Kurlyandskaya, 2005b).16 
However, although these formulas appear to be even more advanced than the schemes used in 
OECD countries, the previous sections showed that despite the objectivity of these formulas 
there have been anomalies. This may confirm reports that despite the objectivity of the used 
methodology, some bargaining over transfers and fiscal relations between the center and 
regions continued (e.g Wetzel, 2004, Solanko and Tekoniemi, 2005). It has also been argued 
that significant unofficial transfers continue to exist (Solanko and Tekoniemi, 2005). This, 
however, cannot explain the anomalities of fiscal equalization outcomes shown above, 
because the data used in this paper do not include unofficial transfers. 
In addition, there may be a problem with regard to the stability of this system, because the 
formulas may be adjusted. Should these adjustments become substantial, the character of the 
system could change, namely away from being rules-based and transparant back to the old 
system of discretion and ad hoc measures.  
The new rules introduced recently have changed the fiscal equalization system, since regional 
governments were mandated to administer equalization funds that address horizontal 
differences among the local governments. A new and reasonable distinction was introduced 
                                                 
16 The Ministry of Finance publishes the methodology of these formulas. An English translation has not yet been 
published. See: http://www.minfin.ru/fvr/mo_2005/ffpr2005.zip. There has been, however, criticism of the formulas 
in that they do not give regions sufficient incentives to increase their fiscal efforts and develop their tax bases. 
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between two groups of local governments, i.e. the district level (local governments with 
stronger population and higher administrative capacities) and the settlement level (local 
governments usually in rural areas with smaller population and smaller administrative 
capacity). But the specifics for calculating these equalization transfers were not defined. Only 
general principles such as population size and fiscal capacity were made mandatory elements 
to be considered in the calculations. It is surprising that an explicit formula is lacking because 
of Russia’s experience with the use of highly advanced formulas to determine equalization 
transfers. Together with considerable technical demands on regions to administer the new 
equalization transfers this lack may facilitate unwanted bargaining.  
4.3  Distribution of expenditure responsibilities 
Regarding expenditure responsibilities, the comprehensive reforms of fiscal federalism 
implemented following the ’Kozak’ commission proposals brought improvements of four 
main types: 
-  Responsibility assignments were clarified particularly concerning the relation between the 
federal level, on the one hand, and regional and local governments, on the other. 
- A distinction between ’delegated’ and ’own’ responsibilities was made with the 
implication that the government level that is delegating must provide sufficient financing 
shown in the budgets (of the central and regional governments). Concerning own 
responsibilities, the respective higher level of government is not allowed to regulate 
expenditure levels or procedures.  
- Unfunded  expenditure  mandates were abolished. 
-  Some important expenditure responsibilties were re-assigned with the new assignments  
closely corresponding to the principles outlined in section 2 and to table 1.  
Although full implemenation of these reforms would require further adjustments of many 
laws and adherence to the reforms was seriously impaired in 2005 following the impossibility 
for regions to implement the ’law on monetization of social benefits’, the following 
evaluation must be based on the new rules. 
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a) The assignment of expenditure responsibilities should be clearcut and follow the 
subsidiarity principle. 
The new order of assignments (detailled surveys are offered by Martinez-Vazquez and 
Timofeev, 2003, and Kurlandskaya, 2004b) includes an exclusive list of “own” 
responsibilities of subnational governments, i.e. regional and local ones, and it adheres closely 
to the subsidiarity principle: Many expenditure responsibilities formerly carried out by the 
central government were given to regional (R) and/or local governments (L) such as wage 
regulation in public sector (R and L), fire protection (R and L), social benefits to disabled (R), 
allowances to families with children (R), wich is a major new burden for regional budgets, 
vocational education (R), preschool education (L), specialized (R) and general healthcare (L), 
and even subsidies to agriculture (R). By contrast, many expenditure responsibilties formerly 
given to regional and/or local governments were assigned in accordance with theory and the 
subsidiarity principle to the central level such as higher education, R&D in healthcare and 
expensive health treatment, fundamental research, army recruiting, benefits for federal 
government officials, subsidies to private enterprises except agriculture, social benefits to 
veterans and Chernobyl victims.  
There appear to be no more overlapping expenditure assignments, also not between regions 
and local governments. If some should exist, a further clarification regarding the questions 
which level regulates, finances and delivers the service would be needed. However, there is an 
obvious problem with setting up a closed list of government responsibilities, since it may not 
be possible to define them exhaustively. 
b) Local governments should have the expenditure responsibility for all those public 
goods and services in the allocation branch, which may be assumed to have 
significant differences in demand in different localities and which are not associated 
with considerable spillovers.  
Several of the services that have been assigned to local governments are associated with 
important spillovers such as basic health care, basic education, and other specific 
infrastructure. Vazquez and Timoffeev (2003) argued that clear rules would be needed to 
ensure that necessary rationalizations of these services are carried out and coordinated. This 
refers to coordination among local governments, on the one hand, and coordination between 
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c)  The efficiency of the fulfillment of responsibilities should be regularly and 
automatically assessed based, for instance, on national and international 
comparisons. 
A regular evaluation of responsibility fulfillment through such measures as performance 
indicators, including measures of the cost-effectiveness of service delivery, was not explicitly 
included in the reforms of fiscal federalism. But it would not be missing provided it is 
included in the administrative reforms. It would be an important aspect of ensuring public 
sector efficiency. Regarding the important services of education, measures of efficiency 
cannot, however, mean that labor productivity figures are used, because this sector achieves 
its results by the quality of knowledge transfered to students where lower labor productivity 
(less students per teacher) may mean better outcomes. 
In sum, the reforms of expenditure assignments are consistent with our evaluative norms and 
there appear to be only few areas for further improvements: These concern the introduction of 
an institution that ensures better coordination among the government levels, especially 
decisions regarding public goods and services with important spillovers, and the introduction 
of regular assessments of responsibility fulfillment through use of performance indicators. 
4.4  Assignment of revenue sources 
Insufficient “own” revenue sources for regional and local governments was identified as a 
major weakness of fiscal federalism and as a hindrance for the system to promote sustained 
nationwide economic growth (e.g. Zhuravskaya, 2000, Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001).17 
Notably, the analyses agree that granting regional and local governments the right to raise and 
determine their own revenues should be an integral part of a reform of inter-governmental 
relations. Also the Kozak Commission recommendations stressed the importance of properly 
financing the newly defined responsibilities of each level of government. But earlier, since 
about 2001, a tax reform was begun, consistent with economic theory, that simplified the tax 
                                                 
17 Major contradictions between the rules set in relevant laws and the actual sharing of tax revenues continued 
throughout the 1990s. Regions kept either parts of revenues from taxes, which were exclusively assigned to the 
federal government (e.g. VAT), or they retained tax revenues they collected partly or even in full and negotiated a 
single payment with the federal government (Zhuravskaya, 2000, Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001). The 
importance of political factors and bargaining power in determining net revenues of both regional and local 
governments has been analyzed and confirmed in these and many other studies (e.g. Treisman, 1996 and 1998, 
and Popov, 2002), and they emphasize the resulting economic problems such as disincentives for tax collections 
and for providing infrastructure for business development, and insufficient responsibilities for expenditures. Discussion Papers   518 
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system by reducing the number of taxes, tax rates and by broadening the base.18 Perhaps this 
may contribute to explain why the reforms implemented show serious problems concerning 
the financing of lower levels of government.19 However, there does not have to be a conflict 
between the goals of a simple and growth promoting tax system and to provide sufficient 
financing for the functions of each level of government including sufficient freedom for them 
to adjust own revenues. There is an additional reason, besides the needed improvement of 
incentives for regions to behave consistently growth promoting, as to why Russia needs 
regional fiscal autonomy: Russia’s regions are relatively heavily exposed to regional income 
shocks due to the uneven distribution of both natural ressources and industry, relatively low 
labor mobility, and procyclical regional fiscal policy (Kwon and Spilimbergo, 2004). To 
counteract these shocks and promote some countercyclical regional fiscal policy, regions 
would need more fiscal freedom. 
a) Lower levels of government should have significant own revenues determined within 
limits by themselves so as to provide them the opportunity to adjust their revenues at 
the margin. 
As shown by table 4, there are relatively few taxes, where subnational governments have 
influence on tax rates and thus on their own-source revenues. Most importantly, the most 
productive taxes, i.e. the VAT, the personal income tax, and the enterprise profit tax, are 
solely controlled by the central government.  
Thus, the revenue assignments lack a very important element, i.e. significant revenue 
discretion given to subnational governments and thus enabling them to adjust own-revenues at 
the margin.  
Regarding regional governments, although they participate in many and partly also productive 
tax revenues, the sharing arrangements consider this discretion only for few and less 
productive taxes and within very narrow limits. For local governments, the assigned own-
                                                 
18 The tax reform started with a reform of the personal income tax in 2001 that included a drastic tax rate 
reduction to a 13% flat tax rate (Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm, 2005) and continued through 2004 when the sales 
tax was abolished, whose revenues had been assigned to the regions.  
19 The share of sub-national government revenues, excluding transfers, in total government revenues declined 
since 1998 from more than 50% to about 40% in 2004. Only due to rising real tax revenues as a result of strong 
economic growth and perhaps also due to the tax reforms the fiscal balances of regional governments improved 
and even became balanced or surpluses in many regions. The order in 2004/2005 for regions to replace in-kind 
social benefits by cash payments reversed these improvements sharply since the estimates of the central 
government of the resulting regional social benefit expenditures were grossly underestimated.  Discussion Papers   518 
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revenues include merely five unproductive taxes and their ability to make adjustments of 
own-revenues is negligible. 
It is striking that with one exception (the gambling tax), no use is made of allowing regional 
governments and possibly also local governments to levy limited surcharges on productive 
taxes such as the income tax, profit tax and excises. This could be a very reasonable way to 
give subnational governments revenue discretion and autonomy, which would also be a 
precondition for making them accountable. Bird (2003) suggested as a way to improve “own” 
revenues of subnational governments while simultaneoulsy improving the allocative 
efficiency of sub-national revenues the introduction of a “business value tax”, which is a 
relatively low rate flat tax levied on an income type value added base. Given that property 
taxes are unlikely to yield significant revenues for years to come, this innovative proposal, 
should receive attention. Discussion Papers   518 
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Table 4-1 
Russia: Distribution of Taxes and Fees Among the Government Levels 1/ 
Specific Tax  Tax 
imposed 
by 2/ 
Tax base 
determined 
by 2/ 
Tax rate 
determined by 2/
Revenue distribution 3/  Principle used 
for revenue 
split 4/ 
Federal taxes and fees           
Enterprise profit tax  F  F  F (since 2005, 
rate is 24%) 
F (27%),  
R + L (73%) 
since 2005: S, 
previously: P 
Simplified system of taxation  F  F  F  F (30%), R (15%),  
L (45%), 
Social security 5%, 
Medical insurance funds 
5% 
S 
VAT F  F  F  F  (100%)   
Excise taxes 
(all except other excises) 
F F  F  F  (100%)   
Excise taxes 
on certain alcohol 
F  F  F  F (50%),  R (50%)  S 
Excise taxes 
on gasoline and diesel 
F  F  F  F (40%),  R (60%)  S 
Export duty for oil products  F  F  F  F (100%)   
Tax on extraction of hydrocarbons  F  F  F  since 2005: 
F (95%), R (5%) 
S 
Tax on extraction of non-common 
natural resources (e.g. precious 
metals etc.) 
F F  F  F  (40%), 
R (60%) 
S 
Water tax  F  F  F (R within limits 
set by F) 
F (40%), 
R (60%) 
S 
Ecological tax (tax on hazardous 
emissions) 
F F  F  F  (19%), 
R (81%) 
S 
Customs duty and fees  F  F  F  F (100%)   
Stamp duty 
(concerning highest courts and 
arbitration courts) 
F F  F  F  (100%)   
Federal license fees  F  F  F  F (100%)   
Gambling tax  F  F  F, R  F (a certain minimum 
amount set by F) + R 
(excess amount) 
P 
Payments for use of sub-soil 
resources under PSA agreements 
F  F  F  Distribution defined by 
PSA  
 
Unified social tax  F  F  F  distributed to social 
insurances 
 
Regional taxes and fees          
Enterprises assets tax  F  F  R (limits set by 
F)  
R (50%), L (50%) 
defined by annual budget 
legislation.   
S 
Personal income tax  F  F  F  R (100%)   
Unified agricultural tax  R  F  R (limits set by 
F) 
F (30%), R (60%), 
Social security 6.4%, 
Medical insurance funds 
3.6% 
S 
Tax on extraction of ’common 
natural resources’ (except 
hydrocarbons, precious metals 
etc.) 
F F  F  R  (100%)   Discussion Papers   518 
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Specific Tax  Tax 
imposed 
by 2/ 
Tax base 
determined 
by 2/ 
Tax rate 
determined by 2/
Revenue distribution 3/  Principle used 
for revenue 
split 4/ 
Transport tax  R  F  R (limits set by 
F) 
R (100%)   
Forest tax   F  F  R (minimum rate 
set by F) 
R (all revenues from 
minimum rate plus 50% 
of exceess) 
F (50% of excess) 
S 
Fee for needs of educational 
institutions 
R   F  R   R (100%)    
Stamp duty (except those of the 
federal government) 
R R  R  R  (100%)   
Local taxes and fees          
Land tax  F  F  L (rate of 
orientation given 
by F) 
R (50%) 
L (50%) 
S 
Personal property tax  F  F  L (limits set by F) L (100%)   
Inheritance and gift tax  F  F  F  L (100%)   
Resort fee  L  F  L (limits set by F) L (100%)   
Tax on imputed income of 
enterprises carrying out outdoor 
advertising 
F F  F  L  (100%)   
1/ The public finance literature defines “own-source” revenues as those over which a government has control in 
either setting the base or the rate of the tax or both. In this table, taxes that are fully determined by the central 
government but whose revenues are received 100% by another level of government are shown as taxes of the 
government level receiving the revenues to highlight the revenue aspect.  
2/ F denotes the federal level, R denotes the regional level, and L denotes the local level. (F) denotes that the 
regional or local government determines the tax rate but within limits set by the the federal government. 
3/ The numbers in brackets give the shares for the central, regional, and local level. 
4/ Principle used to determine the split of tax revenues among government levels: S denotes taxes that are 
shared. P denotes taxes where lower levels of government may levy a surcharge on the tax rate imposed by 
the central government (piggybacking principle). 
Sources: Federal Law ”On basic principles of tax system”; Tax Code of the Russian Federation, Federal Law of 
August 2004; Center for Fiscal Policy, “Federal, regional, and local taxes”, Moscow, Russia, 
http://english.fpcenter.ru/themes/english/materials-document, and Andreeva and Golovanova (2003), 
p. 18. 
 
b) The revenue sources granted to subnational governments should be sufficient to cover 
their expenditure responsibilities.  
A new substantial financing problem appeared as a result of the underestimation by the 
central government of social expenditures of regional governments when the law on 
monetization of benefits required regions to replace in-kind benefits by cash-payments. 
Assuming that a solution may be found to this problem, for instance through a combination of 
further reductions of the benefits and additional earmarked transfers from the central 
government, the sufficiency of own-revenues for regional governments may be adequate. For 
local governments a serious problem is that their own-revenue sources include merely five Discussion Papers   518 
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relatively unproductive taxes, and thus they are grossly insufficient (as shown also in table 3) 
making local governments fully dependent on transfers.  
c) Taxes levied by subnational governments should not concern the relatively mobile 
factors of production with the exception of surcharges, for instance levied on the 
personal income tax, which they should be allowed to levy within limits. 
Most of the tax revenues assigned to subnational governments are levied on relatively 
immobile factors (e.g. property taxes, land tax, agricultral tax). However, with the exception 
of the gambling tax, surcharges are absent. 
d) Natural resources (although immobile) should be taxed by the central government. 
The central government fully determines all of the taxes on natural resource extraction. 
Regions receive only 5% of the revenues from taxes on oil and gas production, which can be 
justified with redistributive arguments and with the savings of a large part of these revenues 
in the stabilization fund. The latter is a reasonable way to avoid too strong real currency 
appreciation of the Ruble that would inhibit the development of non-oil industry. 
e) The revenue sources should increase together with the responsibilities without a 
significant time lag.  
Further shifts in the responsibility assignments may be unlikely since they are well designed 
and clearcut. However, since the quality and quantity of most services will probably be 
expected by residents to increase with rising living standards, total real expenditures may 
need to increase. Since particularly local governments have almost no discretion in adjusting 
their revenues, this recommendation cannot be considered as being fulfilled.  
f)  The revenue sources should be relatively stable and predictable. 
Looking only at the most productive tax revenues we find: the relatively stable and 
predictable VAT revenues are assigned to the central government and not shared. The more 
volatile and less predictable revenues from profit and income taxes are assigned mostly to 
regional governments (without any control over these taxes given to them).  
 Discussion Papers   518 
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5 Concluding  remarks 
Although the implemented reforms brought remarkable improvements regarding expenditure 
assignments and also partly concerning their financing, there may be significant flaws 
because the fiscal equalization that regional governments have to carry out to reduce 
horizontal inequalities among local governments may have weaknesses that invite bargaining. 
In addition, own-revenues of subnational regions that they can influence appear insufficient 
and  local governments may even depend almost fully on transfers. Hence, the current alleged 
standstill in adherence to the reforms of fiscal federalism following the problems for many 
regions to implement the law on monetization of social benefits could be a chance to amend 
the reforms further as suggested. This should bring effective, growth promoting incentives to 
subnational governments, and beginning income convergence among regions. 
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 2002 could be used due to data problems.  2/ The regions Evenkijskij AO and Tajmyrskij AO were excluded due to data problems.  3/ For the regions Evenkijskij AO and 
Tajmyrskij AO only the years 2001 and 2002 could be used due to data problems. 
Source: Goskomstat and Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 3
Russia:  Regional indicators, Panel 1
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Marginal tax on collected tax revenues, including net 
transfers (MTR2), averages 1996-2003 
Source: Goskomstat and Ministry of Finance.
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1/ For the regions Tajmyrskij AO and Evenkijskij AO the years 2001 and 2002 were excluded due to data problems. 
Source: Goskomstat and Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 4
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, averages 1996-2003 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Oblast tax revenues before equalization 
(percent of per capita national average)
E
q
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
o
b
l
a
s
t
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
Line of "neutrality" of the fiscal equalization system
Line of complete fiscal equalization
Chukotskij AO
Jamalo-Neneckij AO
Hanty-Mansijskij AO
Neneckij AO
Evenkijskij AO 1/
Tajmyrskij (Dolgano-Neneckij) AO 1/ Korjakskij AO
Moscow city 
Aginskij Burj.AO
Magadanskaja oblast
Sakha(Jakutia) Republic
Krasnojarskij kraj
Lipeckaja oblast
1/ For the regions Evenkijskij AO and Tajmyrskij AO the years 2001 and 2002 were excluded due to data problems. 
Source: Goskomstat and Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 4.1
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 1996 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.2
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 1997 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.3
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 1998 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.4
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 1999 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.5
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 2000 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.6
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 2001 1/ 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.7
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 2002 1/ 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
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Figure 4.8
Regional revenues before and after fiscal equalization, 2003 
(in percent of the national per capita average)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Oblast tax revenues before equalization 
(percent of national average)
E
q
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
o
b
l
a
s
t
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
Line of "neutrality" of the fiscal equalization system
Line of complete fiscal equalization
Chukotskij AO
Jamalo-Neneckij AO
Hanty-Mansijskij AO
Neneckij AO
Evenkijskij AO
Tajmyrskij (Dolgano-Neneckij) AO
Korjakskij AO
Moscow city 
Aginskij Burjatskij AO
Magadanskaja oblast
Sakha(Jakutia) Republic
Komi Republic
Krasnojarskij kraj
Lipeckaja oblast
I
II
IV III
 
 
 